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ARTICLES
REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR IMPORT
COMPETITION IN THE UNITED STATES*
Leslie W. Jacobst andRandallA. Hovett

Foreign trade has increased more than ten-fold in the last thirty years'
to almost $1.3 trillion annually.2 Over one-sixth of everything grown or
manufactured in the world is traded internationally. 3 In the United States
in the last few years, exports and imports have represented a greater share
of the Gross National Product than ever before.4 In fact, this growth of
* This Article is adapted from lectures given by Mr. Jacobs at the Federal Bar
Association's Antitrust Seminar in Cleveland, Ohio, on April 18, 1979, and the Ohio State Bar
Association's Corporate Counsel Institute on October 21, 1978. The authors wish to express
their gratitude to Mary Brigid McManamon, Cornell Law School class of 1980, for her invaluable assistance in connection with this Article.
t Partner, Thompson, Hine and Flory, Cleveland, Ohio. B.S.B.A. 1965, Northwestern
University; J.D. 1968, Harvard Law School.
tt Associate, Thompson, Hine and Flory, Cleveland, Ohio. B.Sc. 1967, University of
Toronto; M.B.A. 1969, Harvard Business School; J.D. 1977, University of Utah Law School.
1. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, PUB. No. G-8,

THE MTN PACKAGE 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as STR PUB. No. G-8].
2. [1978] PRESIDENT'S TWENTY-THIRD

ANN.

REP. ON THE TRADE

PROGRAM I [hereinafter cited as TWENTY-THIRD ANN. REP.].
3. STR PUB. No. G-8, supra note 1.
4. TWENTY-THIRD ANN. REP., supra note 2, at 123.
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foreign trade is even more sudden in the United States than elsewhere. The
absolute value of U.S. imports and exports far surpasses that of any other
nation.5 Of even greater importance, the United States suffered its first
overall trade deficit of this century in 1971, and the situation has worsened.
In 1979, there was a $29.13 billion excess of imports over exports and an
overall balance of payments deficit of $24.69 billion. 6 Because of these and
other factors, a new spirit of protectionism has arisen 7 and as a result many
businesses are seeking relief from foreign competition.
This Article considers the use of existing laws to challenge the abuse of
U.S. markets by foreign sellers. Because domestic businesses perceive an
increasing need for redress of injury from import competition and the
relevant legislation is scattered and complex, a comparison of the available
alternatives is vital to a practitioner. This Article, therefore, does not only
address the question of what actions a U.S. company can legally take to
combat the threat of unfairly priced foreign products. It also discusses the
principal factors to consider in determining the pertinence and relative
attractiveness of each alternative.

I
THE STATUTORY SCHEME
There are several statutory avenues to attack unfair import competition. Possible relief includes the following measures: imposition of
antidumping8 or countervailing duties;9 other administrative relief, such as
5. The value of U.S. imports in 1977 was $187 billion. Exports were valued at $176
billion. The comparable figures for West Germany were $130 billion and $142 billion; for
Japan, $84 billion and $96 billion. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. TRADE POLICY
AND THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 3 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as CBO BACKGROUND PAPER].

6. Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1980, at II, col. I. The balance of payments deficit in 1971 was $1.5
billion; in 1972, $5.8 billion; in 1974, $1.8 billion; in 1976, $5.7 billion; in 1977, $26.6 billion;
and in 1978, $28.4 billion. The balance of payments figures exclude government arms sales
and contain certain other adjustments. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
ON U.S. ADMINISTRATION OF THE ANTIDUMPING ACT OF 1921, at 5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT].

7. For a brief discussion of the recent rise in protectionist sentiment, see CBO
BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 5, at 5-7.

8. The law in force until this year was the Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160171 (1976); regulations are set forth in 19 C.F.R. pt. 153 (1979). This law was repealed effective January 1, 1980, and replaced by a new Title VII(B) to the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 731-740 (1976), as set forth in § 101 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 9639, 93 Stat. 144 (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673i). New regulations have been proposed for both antidumping and countervailing duties. Proposed regulations 19 C.F.R.
§§ 155.1-.64 (promulgated by the Treasury Department), 44 Fed. Reg. 57,044 (Oct. 3, 1979);
final regulations 19 C.F.R. pt. 207 (promulgated by the International Trade Commission), 44
Fed. Reg. 76,458 (Dec. 26, 1979). See also note 44 infra.
9. Tariff Act of 1930, § 303, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976), as amendedby Trade Agreements
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financial assistance to domestic persons,' 0 limitations on imports," exclusion of the imported articles,' 2 or a cease and desist order; 13 investigations
of import practices;' 4 and antitrust proceedings.' 5 In general, these laws
are not punitive, nor do they directly benefit the injured domestic parties by
providing damages.' 6 Instead, the laws are intended to relieve such parties
from the need to compete with artificially low prices for foreign goods. The
newly rediscovered provisions of the antitrust laws, however, do provide for
private treble damage actions,' 7 criminal penalties,' 8 forfeitures, 19 and
injunctive relief 20 for unfair competition and restraints of trade in the sale
of imported goods.
Prior to the 1970's, while the volume and proportion of U.S. imports
2
were relatively low, the number of import relief proceedings was steady. 22'
As the trade balance deteriorated, however, enforcement efforts increased,
and cases became more complex. 23 Finally, Congress passed the Trade Act
Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, §§ 101, 103, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1303, 1701-1707, 1751-1778).
10. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 201-284, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2394 (1976) (so-called "escape
clause" proceeding).
11. Id.
12. Tariff Act of 1930, § 337, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976), as amended by Trade Agreements
Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 1105, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337

(b), (e), (0).

13. Id.
14. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, § 22, 7 U.S.C. § 624 (1976); Tariff Act of 1930,
§ 332, 19 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
15. Wilson Tariff Act §§ 73-76, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1976); Clayton Act §§ 4, 15-16, 15
U.S.C. §§ 15, 25-26 (1976). The Antidumping Act of 1916, §§ 801-802, 15 U.S.C. §§ 72-73
(1976), also belongs conceptually in this category.
16. A civil penalty of up to $10,000 or the domestic value of the articles may be recovered
by the U.S. Government in the event of a violation of a cease and desist order. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 1105, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (amending Tariff Act of 1930,
§ 337, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976)). Under certain conditions firms may be eligible for financial
assistance under escape clause proceedings. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 251-264, 19 U.S.C. §§ 23412354 (1976). Finally, treble damages and other relief may be available in antitrust proceedings. See notes 17-20 infra and accompanying text.
17. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976); Antidumping Act of 1916, § 801, 15 U.S.C.
§ 72 (1976).
18. Wilson Tariff Act § 73, 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1976); Antidumping Act of 1916, § 801, 15

U.S.C. § 72 (1976).
19. Wilson Tariff Act § 76, 15 U.S.C. § 11 (1976).
20. Clayton Act §§ 15-16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 25-26 (1976).
21. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
22. Mundheim, Developments in Antidumping Law, 34 Bus. LAW. 1831 (1979); Rein, Legal
Remedies Against UnfairImport Competition, 9 LAW NOTEs 45, 45 (1973).
23. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
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of 197424 which was a watershed in this area. That Act amended the old
26
forms of relief 25 and added several new ones.

In addition to the change in then-existing laws, the Trade Act of 1974
enabled the President to participate in the Tokyo Round negotiations of the
General Agreement on. Tariffs and Trade (GATT).27 As a result of the
Tokyo Round, the United States signed ten international trade agreements
("codes") in Geneva on April 12, 1979.28 These codes required implement-

ing legislation in the United States. 2 9 That legislation, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (the "Act"), was introduced on June 19, 1979,30 and was
passed by the House on July 11, and by the Senate on July 23, 1979. 3 1 The
President approved it on July 26, 1979.32
The Act attempts to align U.S. nontariff trade restrictions with the new
codes produced by the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Title I of the Act
adds to the Tariff Act of 193033 a new Title VII dealing with antidumping
and countervailing duties. 34 Title IX of the Act amends and strengthens
24. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1976).
25. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 321, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (amending
Antidumping Act of 1921, §§ 201, 203-205, 212(3), 19 U.S.C. §§ 160, 162-164, 170a (1976));
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 331(a), 173, 341(a)-(b), 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (amending Tariff Act of 1930, §§ 303, 332(g), 337, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1332, 1337 (1976)).
26. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 201-284, 301-302, 406, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2394, 2411-2412, 2436
(1976).
27. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 101-175, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified in
scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
28. The ten codes signed are Subsidies/Countervailing Measures, Antidumping, Customs
Valuation, Government Procurement, Technical Barriers to Trade, Import Licensing Procedures, Trade in Civil Aircraft, International Dairy Arrangement, Bovine Meat Arrangement,
and Group "Framework." For the texts of these codes, see AGREEMENTS REACHED INTHE
TOKYO ROUND OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 96-153, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
29. Under special rules adopted in the Trade Act of 1974, each House of Congress had to
accept or reject the President's legislative proposals as a whole, without amendments, within 60
legislative days after introduction. Trade Act of 1974, § 151, 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (1976).
30. H.R. 4537, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). This bill reflected extensive pre-introduction
political compromise among the Administration (through the Special Trade Representative),
the Congress (through the Trade Subcommittees of the Senate Finance Committee and the
House Committee on Ways and Means), and U.S. industry. See, e.g., Implementation of the
Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intl Trade of the Senate
Comm on Finance, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (Feb. 21-22, 1979); Multinational Trade Negotiations:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on General Oversight and Minority Enterprise of the House
Comrm. on Small Bus., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 20, Apr. 4, 1979); SUBCOMM. ON TRADE OF
THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATION IMPLEMENTING THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(Comm. Print 1979). This unique series of hearings and "gentlemen's agreements" preceding
the filing of the bill was occasioned by the special legislative procedures. See note 29 supra.

31.
32.
33.
34.

125 CONG. REC. H5,690-91, SIO,389-91 (1979).
Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979).
19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1654 (1976).
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (1979).
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section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 35 which deals with foreign trade practices that restrict or discriminate against U.S. commerce. Title X considerably expands the availability of judicial review of administrative
determinations. 36 Title XI, among other things, adds a civil penalty for the
violation of a cease and desist order under section 337 of the Tariff Act of
193037 and makes other technical amendments to the Trade Act of 1974.38

Titles I-VIII deal with tariff and tax measures.

In addition to the substantive and procedural changes wrought by
GATT and reflected in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the Administration promulgated a reorganization plan to improve the enforcement and

change the duties of the responsible agencies involved with trade. 39 The

plan, among other things, transferred responsibility for countervailing and
antidumping duty proceedings from Treasury to the Department of Com-

merce. It also strengthened and centralized the trade policy coordination
and negotiation functions of the Office of the Special Trade Representative
for Trade Negotiations, to be renamed the Office of the United States Trade
Representative. Whether this plan will do more than juggle the players
around remains to be seen.
II
SPECIAL DUTIES
A.

ANTIDUMPING DUTIES

An American manufacturer's most immediate concerns are normally
the effect of foreign price competition on the domestic company's market
share and price. Dumping tends to erode both share and price. Dumping
usually occurs when a foreign competitor's export price to the United States
35. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1976), as amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-39, §§ 901-903, 93 Stat. 144 (1979).
36. Title X amends § 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1976), and adds a
new § 516A (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1516a) governing judicial appeals from antidumping
or countervailing duty proceedings.
37. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 1105, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (amending Tariff Act of 1930, § 337, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976)).
38. Id. § 1106.
39. For a summary of the Administration's proposal, see Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44
Fed. Reg. 69,273 (1979). This proposal included a number of congressional recommendations.
See REORGANIZArION PLAN No. 3 OF 1979, H.R. REP. No. 96-585, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(Nov. 2, 1979); REORGANIZATION PLAN No. 3 OF 1979, S. REP. No. 96-402, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 44 (Nov. 7, 1979). Hearings were held on the proposal in both the House and the Senate,
and in each case the formal resolution to reject it was overwhelmingly disapproved by the
responsible committee. H.R. Res. 428,96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. Res. 245, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979). On January 2, 1980, the President implemented this reorganization by executive
order. Exec. Order No. 12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980).

6

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 13:1

is less than its price in the home country or other countries. The competitor
may even be selling to the United States at a price below total cost. Price
discrimination of this variety can be beneficial to the seller, particularly
when it operates from an insulated home market with little fear of competitive retaliation and either faces the low portion of a business cycle with
large fixed costs or is temporarily restricted in its ability to reduce employment. In these circumstances, it will be economically worthwhile to make
foreign sales as long as the price is sufficient to cover variable costs. In
these situations, the foreign competitor may be dumping its product in the
40
United States at the expense of American manufacturers' sales.

The statute now governing dumping is new. Section 101 of the Trade
Agreements Act of 197941 supersedes the Antidumping Act of 1921.42 The
new provisions, however, are basically a recodification of the old law, with
certain changes in procedure. 43 In order for a special dumping duty to be
assessed on foreign merchandise, the administering authority44 must first
find that "a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be,
sold in the United States at less than its fair value" (LTFV).4 5 Then, under
40. For a general discussion of the dumping phenomenon, see Myerson, A Review ofCurrent Antidumping Procedures: UnitedStates Law and the Case ofJapan, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 167 (1976).
41. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-16 7 7g).
42. 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (1976) (repealed by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-39, § 106(a), 93 Stat. 144 (1979)).
43. "The implementation of the anti-dumping code should have little immediate effect on
the United States. Current U.S. practice is generally in conformance with the provisions of the
code, and no major changes in U.S. laws are anticipated." CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
THE EFFECTS OF THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE U.S.

ECONOMY: AN UPDATED VIEW 32 (1979). In fact, much of the criticism of the antidumping
remedies attacked the administration of the law rather than its substance. See, e.g.,Admlnistration of the Antidumping Act of 1921: Hearing Be/ore the Subcomm. on Trade of the House
Comm. on Ways andMeans on Assessment and Collection fDuties Under the Ant/dumping Act
of1921, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); Oversight otheAntidumpingAct of1921: HearingBe/ore
the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means on the Adequacy and the
Administration of/he Antidumping Act of 1921, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
44. Section 77 1(1) of the Tariff Act of 1930, addedby Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(1)), defined the
administering authority as "the Secretary of the Treasury, or any other officer of the United
States to whom the responsibility for carrying out the duties of the administering authority
under this title are transferred by law." The Administration's reorganization plan shifted
administration to the Department of Commerce. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
Some might view this shift as a protectionist one, since Treasury is perceived to have a "free
trade" bias, while Commerce is the opposite. The Administration claimed not to view the
change as one toward protectionism, however, expecting only more efficient enforcement.
Statement of James T. McIntyre, Jr., Director of Office of Management and Budget, before the
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee at 11 (July 23, 1979).
45. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (adding
new § 731(1) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1)).
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the new Act, the International Trade Commission (the "Commission")

46

must determine that a domestic industry "is materially injured" or "is
threatened with material injury," or that "the establishment of an industry

in the United States is materially retarded" by reason of the sale of the
imports.4 7 Thus the decision whether to proceed with an antidumping

action involves a two-tiered analysis. First, is there a sale, or a likelihood of
sale, at LTFV? If so, is there material injury or a threat thereof?.

"Fair value" has no relation to the costs or prices of U.S. producers;
thus it can be either lower or higher.than those prices. 48 It is usually considered to be the foreign manufacturer's f.o.b. plant price to purchasers in
the country of export. 4 9 The first question to ask, therefore, is whether the

foreign competitor's f.o.b. plant price to U.S. customers is less than its price
at home. If the prices are the same, a finding of dumping is unlikely. Thus
the domestic product may be faced with valid price competition from
abroad.
The rule differs if the foreign manufacturer does not sell, or sells only

relatively small quantities, in its home market, or has sold below cost there
for an extended period. Then the reference point may be either f.o.b. plant

sales at prices above cost to customers in third countries, or a "constructed
value," which is the average cost of production over a business cycle plus
10% for general expenses and 8% for profit.50 Thus, if the foreign producer
46. The new Act defines the Commission as "the United States International Trade Commission." Id. (adding new § 771(2) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(2)). The Administration's plan was not clear as to whether this provision will be
changed.
47. Id. (adding new § 731(2) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2)).
Under § 201 of the Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1976) (repealed by Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 106(a), 93 Stat. 144 (1979)), the Commission had
to determine if an industry "is being or is likely to be injured, or is prevented from being
established." Congress apparently did not want to change the standard and indicated that a
Commission determination of threat "must be based upon information showing that the threat
is real and injury is imminent, not a mere supposition or conjecture." S. REP. No. 96-249, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 88-89 (1979).
48. "Fair value" is not defined in the Act. Congress apparently intended the concept to be
applied essentially as an estimate of "foreign market value." See HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS
COMM., TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979, H.R. REP. No. 96-317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 59
(1979).
49. See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (1979)
(adding new § 773(a)(1) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(l)).
50. Id. (adding new §§ 773(a)(2), (e) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C.
1677b(a)(2), (e)). Formerly, § 206 of the Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. § 165 (1976)
(repealed by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 106(a), 93 Stat. 144 (1979)),
arguably required third country prices to be sought first before constructed value could be
used. New § 773(a)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930 authorizes either standard to be used and
eliminates any preference. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat.
144 (1979) (adding new § 773(a)(2) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(a)(2)). An exporter may cite cost justification for large volume U.S. sales as an expla-
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sells very little at home, the inquiry becomes whether the competitor's
prices in other countries are above its U.S. prices, or whether there is reason
to believe costs at home would preclude making a profit on U.S. sales.
A domestic manufacturer should consider filing a petition for relief
from dumping if the manufacturer suspects that a competitor is attempting
to maintain its volume and employment during a period of excess capacity,
or gain a market share in the United States by taking a loss or significantly
narrowing its routine overseas margins on U.S. sales. The complainant
must remember the second prong of the dumping test, however-material
injury.
"Material injury" is now defined as "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant." 5 1 The Commission must consider several factors in making a determination of material injury. First, is "the
volume of imports of the merchandise, or any increase in that volume,
either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the
United States, . . . significant"? 52 Second, has there "been significant price
undercutting by the imported merchandise as compared with the price of
like products of the United States"?5 3 Third, does "the effect of imports of
such merchandise otherwise [depress] prices to a significant degree or [prevent] price increases, which otherwise would have occurred to a significant
degree"? 54 Fourth, what is the "actual and potential decline in output,
sales, market share, profits, productivity, return on investments, and utilization of capacity"? 55 Finally, the Commission must consider the "factors
affecting domestic prices" 56 and the "actual and potential negative effects
on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital, and investment." 57 The presence or absence of any single factor is not
(a) similar discounts are given on domestic sales in
nation for a cost differential, but only if.
the exporter's home country on at least 20% of the total sales in that country for a period of at
least six months before any particular U.S. sale; (b) such discounts are freely available; and (c)
cost savings are provable in relation to the quantities sold. 19 C.F.R. § 153.9 (1979).
51. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (adding
new § 771(7)(A) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A)). "Material
injury" is supposedly a strengthening of the old law's injury test. But see note 62 infra.
52. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (adding
new § 771(7)(C)(i) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(i)).
53. Id. (adding new § 771(7)(C)(ii)(I) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(7)(C)(ii)(I)).
54. Id. (adding new § 771(7)(C)(ii)(II) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(7)(C)(ii)(II)).
55. Id. (adding new § 771(7)(C)(iii)(I) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(7)(C)(iii)(I)).
56. Id. (adding new § 771(7)(C)(iii)(II) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(7)(C)(iii)(II)).
57. Id. (adding new § 771(7)(C)(iii)(III) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(7)(C)(iii)(III)).
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decisive, and Congress has made clear that the Commission must consider
the facts of each particular case.- s

Since the enactment of the 1974 Trade Act, the success rate in dumping
proceedings has been about 50%. 59 The new Act will probably not have

much impact on these results. Should a domestic manufacturer initiate a
dumping proceeding? 60 Perhaps, but there is more to consider than the
merits of the case. First, the manufacturer must evaluate the cost of the

proceeding. There is usually a large burden on the complainant to produce
detailed economic data supporting the dumping charge. 6' This burden
might be even greater now that the new law requires the injury to be "mate-

rial."' 62 Unfortunately, a domestic company will probably have to under-

take an investigation and hire an economist to determine the merits of the
case.

Second, even if the domestic company can afford to pay the costs of the
suit, it should evaluate the relief that a successful suit provides. If injury is
found, the only relief available is a special dumping duty. 63 Treasury is
58. S. REP. No. 96-249, supra note 47, at 88.
59. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 6, at 72-74.
60. If the domestic manufacturer decides to institute an antidumping action, the procedure is detailed in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144
(1979) (adding new §§731-735 to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 16731673d). The maximum period for an antidumping proceeding is 420 days, with the ordinary
proceeding expected to take 235 days. See S. REP. No. 96-249, supra note 47, at 72-73. Under
the Antidumping Act of 1921, investigations usually consumed 13 months and could last up to
16 months.
61. 19 C.F.R. § 153.27 (1979); Myerson, supra note 40, at 192. Of course, this regulation
refers to the Antidumping Act of 1921. Since, however, a major change in the law is not
anticipated, see note 43 supra, the requirement will probably remain in effect.
62. The current standard is generally considered to be "more than de minimus," a standard that was set forth in Titanium Sponge from the USSR, 33 Fed. Reg. 10,769, 10,772 (Tariff
(Comm'n 1968). That standard had been criticized as not in line with the international standard of material injury. Myerson, supra note 40, at 188-90. Recent Commission decisions,
however, as well as the legislative history of the new Act, indicate that the introduction of a
"material injury" standard may not result in a drastic change in Commission results. For
example, in Perchloroethylene from Belgium, France, and Italy, U.S. ITC Pub. No. 969 (Apr.
1979), the Commission indicated that its standard is injury that is "more than frivolous, inconsequential, insignificant, or immaterial." Id. at 4. The new statutory definition in § 771(7) is
injury that is "not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant." Trade Agreements Act of
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (adding new § 771(7)(A) to Tariff Act of
1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A)). It is difficult to see the difference between
"material" and "more than de minimus."
63. This duty equals the "foreign market value," Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L.
No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (adding new § 773 to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at
19 U.S.C. § 1677b), minus the "United States Price," which is either the f.o.b. factory
"purchase price" to buyers in the United States, id. (adding new § 772(b) to Tariff Act of 1930,
to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(b)), or the "exporter's sales price" which is "the price at
which merchandise is sold. . . in the United States ... for the account of the exporter," id.
(adding new § 772(c) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(C)).
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approximately three years behind in assessing dumping duties, although it
hopes to clear up these difficulties by assigning more staff. 64 In practice,
however, few duties are ever collected because foreign manufacturers simply adjust prices upward, thereby closing the gap between the prices of foreign and domestic products. 65 In those cases where duties are payable,
there has been an unconscionable delay in actual collection. For example,
Alexander's, Inc., the New York department store, pled guilty on March 29,
1979, to criminal customs fraud involving secret rebates on Japanese television sets imported in 1974.66 The dumping duties still have not been col67
lected.
Even if the duties were collected immediately upon assessment, the
relief might be too late. There is usually a significant period of pre-filing
preparation, followed by a lapse of from ten to seventeen months between
the filing of an acceptable petition and an affirmative determination of
dumping. 68 Thus a foreign manufacturer may survive a temporary downturn in demand or establish a U.S. market share before the administering
authority completes an investigation.
The new code attempts to improve the overall procedure. Although it
is too early to determine the effectiveness of these measures, a few tentative
conclusions may be advanced. First, the overall proceeding may be shortened, but probably not dramatically. 69 The relief provided, however, may
prove more effective. The new provisions for immediate suspension of liquidation upon a preliminary determination of sales at LTFV 70 should provide more relief when an American manufacturer faces dumping for the
purpose of establishing market share. Moreover, in the case of persistent
past dumping, the petitioner can allege "critical circumstances" 71 at the
time of filing to enable a retroactive ninety-day suspension of liquidation to
be made.
Second, the long-run effect of the new law may be more litigation in
the courts. The procedures are still complex, but the availability ofjudicial
64. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 6, at 82.

65. See id. at 10. This adjustment is not necessarily a problem, however, since a price
increase and a duty produce the same competitive effect.
66. N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1979, § 4, at 1,col. 6.
67. See Adminisiration of the Anidumping Act of 1921, supra note 43, at 63.
68. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 6, at 72-74.
69. The new code provides for a time focus ofbetween 235 and 420 calendar days. S. REP.
No. 96-249, supra note 47, at 72-73. For a detailed comparison of elapsed time for investigations during the years 1972-77, see COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 6,at 70-75.
70. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (adding
new § 733(d)(1) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d)(1)).
71. Id. (adding new § 733(e) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(e)).
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review is vastly expanded with increased Customs Court jurisdiction 72 and

the possibility of immediate judicial review for five varieties of interlocu-

tory determinations 73 and four final determinations. 74 Further, since the

category of interested parties now specifically includes representative
unions and trade associations, the opportunities to spread the costs of liti-

gating antidumping determinations are more readily available. Therefore,
small domestic manufacturers, otherwise barred by the high cost of litiga-

tion, may be encouraged to seek relief.
Another source of litigation may be the new provision for suspension
of an investigation upon the acceptance of an agreement between the

United States and foreign exporters to cease exports or eliminate dumping
by adjusting prices. That provision was designed "to permit rapid and
pragmatic resolutions of antidumping duty cases."'75 Congress did not
intend it to become the normal means to dispose of cases; it may be under-

76
taken only to serve the interests of the public and the domestic industry.
Suspension of an investigation can occur only after an affirmative preliminary determination has been made. In addition, 85% of the exporters must

be parties to the agreement. Since the decision to suspend the investigation

and accept an agreement is subject to judicial review,77 the petitioner may
appeal if he is not satisfied with the agreement. Thus the provision for an
agreement to eliminate dumping may become a frequent source of collateral dispute.
Third, the elements required to be proved may not in fact have

changed. Although the standard is now "material injury," the statutory
definition of that term is "not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimpor72. Id. § 1001, (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1514, 1515(a), 1516, 1516a, 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1514(a), 1582, 2632(f), 2633). In addition, a pending bill, S. 1654, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979), would change the name of the United States Customs Court to the United States Court
of International Trade and expand its jurisdiction to entertain any civil action arising out of
import transactions or under U.S. trade legislation. "S. 1654 would add the last missing pieces
of the puzzle begun so many years ago by filling the few remaining spaces left open by the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979." Testimony of David M. Cohen, Branch Director, Commercial
Litigation Branch, Civil Division, Department of Justice, before Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept.
10, 1979). The Senate passed the bill on December 18, 1979. 125 CONG. REc. S18,968-75
(1979). It was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on December 20, 1979. Id. at
H12,448.
73. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 1001, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (adding
new § 516A(a)(l) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(1)).
74. Id. (adding new § 516A(a)(2) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(a)(2)).
75. S. REP. No. 96-249, supra note 47, at 71.
76. Id.
77. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 1001, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (adding
new § 516A(a)(2)(B)(iv) to Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iv)).
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tant."'78 Congress apparently felt that recent Commission decisions have
been consistent with that standard. 79 Although a "more than de minimus"
standard supposedly has been used since 1968,80 recent Commission decisions have described it as injury that is "more than frivolous, inconsequential, insignificant, or immaterial."' s It is hard to see a difference between
the old and new tests.
Fourth, the Act, which specifically defines the term "industry" for the
first time, answers the question of whether an affected "industry" must be
national or can also be regional. The definition provides that an industry
may consist of all domestic producers, producers of a major portion of the
total domestic production, or a regional industry.8 2 A regional industry
may exist if there is a high concentration of imports in an isolated regional
market. 83 These requirements are consistent with recent Commission decisions. 84 The new definition is broader, however, since it does not require
.that the region constitute a major or even a significant part of the domestic
industry as is currently the practice. It is conceivable, then, that the new
statutory definition would allow isolated, small regional industries to petition for relief without having to undertake a broader economic study or
prove a more pervasive impact of an unfair import practice.
Finally, imports from state-controlled economies remain a problem.
These countries are not signatories to the GATT, and it is not clear on what
basis the "fair value" of their imports may be determined. Treasury regulations have provided that constructed value may be based on prices in a
country at a similar stage of economic development in which the economy
is not state-controlled. 85 However, Congress, even though reenacting current statutory law, 86 specifically did not approve or disapprove this regula78. Id. § 101 (adding new § 771(7)(A) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C.

§ 1677(7)(A)).
79. S. REP. No. 96-249, supra note 47, at 87.
80. See note 62 supra.
81. Perchloroethylene from Belgium, France, and Italy, U.S. ITC Pub. No. 969 (Apr.
1979).
82. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (adding
new § 771(4) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)).
83. Id. (adding new § 771(4)(C) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C.

§ 1677(4)(C)).
84. For example, in Carbon Steel Plate from Taiwan, U.S. ITC Pub. No. 970 (May 1979),
the Commission proposed a set of three factors for determining whether an industry can be
subdivided regionally: (I) whether the region under consideration is separate and identifiable;
(2) whether LTFV imports are concentrated in that region; (3) whether that region constitutes
a significant part of the domestic industry. Id. at 20. See also Sugar from Belgium, France,
and West Germany, U.S. ITC Pub. No. 972 (May 1979).
85. 43 Fed. Reg. 35,262 (Aug. 9, 1978).
86. S.REP. No. 96-249, supra note 47, at 95.
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tion.8 7 It therefore remains to be seen how fair value will be calculated in
such cases.
Use of the antidumping statute is a cumbersome way to deal with
international price discrimination. Even with the recent amendments, the
administrative superstructure remains awkward. This problem was probably exacerbated rather than cured by shortening time periods and adding
judicial review. Nonetheless, a dumping petition is often the most attractive alternative when a significant price discrepancy exists, particularly
when the discrepancy is persistent.88 Furthermore, even though a company
may not have an iron-clad injury case, it may still wish to file a petiton
since, if the administering authority makes an affirmative preliminary
determination of sales at LTFV, the authority must order immediate suspension of liquidation. A suspension order should have a strong positive
impact on import prices during the later stages of the proceeding because a
bond for an indeterminate contingent duty must be posted.8 9 Many businesses, including importers, do not like to make sales when they do not
know their costs. As a consequence, the dumping petition may have the
effect, hopefully now more immediate, of causing a foreign competitor to
revise its prices upward.
B.

COUNTERVAILING DUTIES

A domestic manufacturer may believe that a foreign competitor is able
to charge unreasonably low prices in the American market because its
home government is considerably more helpful to business enterprises than
is the United States. If the domestic manufacturer is correct, the critical
question is exactly what does the foreign government contribute to the competitor? The answer to that question is important because the countervailing duty statute allows the administering authority 90 to impose
additional duties on imports aided by a "bounty or grant" from any foreign
country that is not under the GATT Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures or a similar agreement. 9 1 If the foreign country is "under
the Agreement," 92 the Commission must also determine that the aid causes
87. Id. at 96.
88. Rein, supra note 22, at 47.
89. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (adding
new § 733(d)(2) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d)(2)).
90. Formerly the Secretary of the Treasury. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
The Reorganization Plan changed the authority to Commerce. See Reorg. Plan No. 3, supra
note 39.
91. TariffAct of 1930, § 303, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976), as amendedby Trade Agreements
Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 103, 93 Stat. 144 (1979).
92. A country under the Agreement is defined as a country:
(1) -between the United States and which the Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
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"material injury" to a domestic industry. 93 Thus an American company
must first determine whether it should bring an action under section 303 of
the Tariff Act of 193094 (country not under the Agreement) or section 701
of that Act 95 (country under the Agreement).
If the foreign country is not under the Agreement, the only issue is
whether that country has provided a "bounty or grant." What constitutes a
"bounty or grant," however, is not specifically set forth in the statute. Early
Supreme Court decisions adopted a broad definition of "bounty or grant"

(2)

vailing Measures applies, as determined under section 2(b) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979;
which has assumed obligations with respect to the United States which are sub-

stantially equivalent to obligations under the Agreement, as determined by the
President; or
(3) with respect to which the President determines that(a) there is an agreement in effect between the United States and that country
which(i) was in force on June 19, 1979, and
(ii) requires unconditional most-favored-nation treatment with respect to
articles imported into the United States;
(b) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade does not apply between the
United States and that country; and
(c) the agreement described in subparagraph (a) does not expressly permit(i) actions required or permitted by the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, or required by the Congress; or
(ii) non-discriminatory prohibitions or restrictions on importation which are
designed to prevent deceptive or unfair practices.
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (adding new
§ 701(b) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 167 1(b)). Section (1) refers to the
GATT signatories; section (2) currently refers only to Taiwan; and section (3) currently refers
only to Venezuela, Honduras, Nepal, North Yemen, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Liberia. See
S. REP. No. 96-249, supra note 47, at 45.
93. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (adding
new § 701(a)(2) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2)). The lack of this
additional requirement of material injury in the old law has been the cause of much criticism
of U.S. countervailing duty law. For a discussion of the tensions regarding this issue at the
Tokyo Round negotiations, see Graham, Reforming the International Trading System: The
Tokyo Round Trade Negotiationsin the FinalStage, 12 CORNELL INT' L.J. 1, 19-24 (1979).

The definition of material injury in a countervailing duty action is the same as for dumping.
In fact, the entire procedure for a countervailing duty determination is virtually identical to
that for a dumping action. Compare Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101,
93 Stat. 144 (1979) (adding new §§ 701-705 to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1671-1671d) with id (adding new §§ 731-735 to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19
U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673d). The principal difference is that instead of having 160 days to make a
preliminary determination, the administering authority has only 85 days to make a preliminary determination on whether there is a subsidy. Id. (adding new § 703 to Tariff Act of 1930,
to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(b)).
94. Tariff Act of 1930, § 303, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976), as amended by Trade Agreements
Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 103, 93 Stat. 144 (1979).
95. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (adding
new § 701 to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1671).
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in upholding the imposition of countervailing duties. 96 Despite the Court's
liberal attitude, Secretaries of the Treasury generally remained hostile to
the imposition of countervailing duties. Since there was no time limit for a
Department regularly delayed its
countervailing duty action, the Treasury
97
investigations for political reasons.
In addition, the countervailing duty statute proved of limited use to

domestic industry because of the small amount of published guidance. The
Secretary of the Treasury had to state only that a bounty or grant had been

found, and its amount. The Secretary did not have to state how the amount
was determined. If Treasury found no bounty or grant, it was not required

to publish its findings at all. Furthermore, while importers had a right to
obtain judicial review of findings of a bounty or grant, domestic industry

had no such right with respect to negative findings. 98
Chapter 3 of the Trade Act of 197499 substantially revitalized the sec-

tion 303 proceeding. The Act made a number of important procedural
changes, including imposition of time limits on the Treasury Department,
mandatory publication of all determinations, and provision for judicial
review of both affirmative and negative findings.' 0 0 However, Chapter 3
failed to define the contours of a "bounty or grant."
That uncertainty is lessened in a section 701 proceeding. The Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, adding section 701 to the Tariff Act of 1930,

defines "subsidy" as follows:
The term 'subsidy' has the same meaning as the term 'bounty or grant' as
96. In Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34 (1919), the Supreme Court held: "If
the word 'bounty' has a limited sense, the word 'grant' has not. A word of broader significance
than 'grant' could not have been used." Id. at 39. See also Downs v. United States, 187 U.S.
496 (1903).
97. Rein, supra note 22, at 47-48. For a discussion of the history of judicial review of
Treasury determinations, see Comment, United States CountervailingDuty Law.- Renewed,
Revamped and Revisited-Trade Act of 1974, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 832, 843-52
(1976); Note, Effective JudicialReview ofAntidumping Determinations, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J.

269 (1979).
98. Comment, supra note 97, at 843.
99. Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 331, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (amending Tariff Act of 1930, § 303, 19
U.S.C. § 1303 (1976)).
100. When Congress added judicial review of negative findings by the Treasury Department, domestic manufacturers thought that this amendment would open the doors for judicial
imposition of duties. Comment, supra note 97, at 849-52. United States v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 430 F. Supp. 242 (Cust. Ct.), rev'd, 562 F.2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977), ard,437 U.S. 443
(1978), however, was a great disappointment because it evidenced a judicial reluctance to
impose duties. The Zenith case involved Japanese Government rebates to exporters of consumer goods of the entire domestic commodity tax previously paid by the exporters to that
Government. Zenith contended that this rebate should be classified as a "bounty," and the
Customs Court agreed. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed and held that,
when a product is exported, the nonexcessive rebate by a government of an indirect tax on that
product is not a bounty. The Supreme Court affirmed.
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that term is used in section 303 of this Act, and includes, but is not limited to,
the following:
(A) Any export subsidy described in Annex A to the Agreement (relating to illustrative list of export subsidies).
(B) The following domestic subsidies, if provided or required by government action to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or
industries, whether publicly or privately owned, and whether paid or
bestowed directly or indirectly on the manufacture, production, or export of
any class or kind of merchandise:
(i) The provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms
inconsistent with commercial considerations.
(ii) The provision of goods or services at preferential rates.
(iii) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating
losses sustained by a specific industry.
(iv) The assumption
of any costs or expenses of manufacture, pro0
duction, or distribution.' 1
In one respect this definition is helpful; it incorporates the illustrative
list of the Agreement. 10 2 The basic definition is circular, however, because
it refers to a non-definition. In other words, the test will be one of facts and
circumstances. A domestic producer must look to the specific examples of
subsidies set forth in the definition and to practices previously pronounced
to be bounties for similarities with the situation at hand. 0 3 Since, however,
101. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (adding
new § 771(5) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)). The four types of
domestic subsidies listed have generally been held to be bounties or grants in past Treasury
determinations. S. REP. No. 96-249, supra note 47, at 84. Current practice of offsetting the
effects of subsidies by increased costs (for example, costs for relocating a factory, Diuron from
Israel, 43 Fed. Reg. 33,860 (1978)), however, will no longer be acceptable. "Net subsidies" will
be used only to calculate the amount of the duties; the types of offsets to gross subsidies to
determine net subsidies are severely restricted. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No, 9639, § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (adding new § 771(6) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1677(6)); S. REP. No. 96-249, supra note 47, at 85. Future litigation, then, will likely
revolve around the meaning of the new definition of domestic subsidy. One unanswered question is whether a government practice of providing disincentives for specific industries to
remain located in a high population area, rather than grants or incentives to locate in low
population areas, constitutes a domestic subsidy. It does not come within the four specific types
of domestic subsidies, but may very well have the same effect. Cf Textiles from Korea, 43
Fed. Reg. 23,791 (1978) (such a practice was a bounty).
102. Annex A is an illustrative list of recognized export subsidies. H.R. Doc. No. 96-153,
pt. I, at 295, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 19, 1979).
103. A provision of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat.
144 (1979) (adding new § 777(a) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(a)),
creates a "library of. . . subsidy practices" to which petitioners can turn to determine what
practices may be considered subsidies. For a comprehensive list of government practices that
ave been held to be bounties or grants, see Comment, supra note 97, at 841 n.75, and S. REP.
No. 96-249, supra note 47, at 84. See, e.g., Nicholas v. United States, 249 U.S. 34 (1919)
(direct subsidy payments); Bicycle Tires and Tubes from Korea, 43 Fed. Reg. 32,910 (1978)
(short-term preferential financing at low interest rates and preferential income tax treatment
for export items); Fish from Canada, 43 Fed. Reg. 29,637 (1978) (regional aids, cash assistance,
and grants for constructing facilities used solely or almost exclusively for exported products).
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the list of subsidies provides for the first time a statutory basis for definition,
albeit vague, of this elusive concept, an American producer should focus
attack on whether there is a subsidy.'°4 The availability of immediate judicial review of a finding of no subsidy may influence the administering
authority to find a subsidy where the practices clearly fall within the statutory examples.
The new material injury requirement, however, may prevent import
relief even if the administering authority finds a subsidy. The Trade Act of
1974 created an injury requirement for the imposition of countervailing
duties on the narrow group of duty-free goods. Of the ten injury investigations completed by the Commission since 1975, injury was found in only
one case.' 05 In virtually all these cases, no injury was found because total
imports were negligible both in amount and in percent of U.S. consumption.'0 6 Given these results, a domestic manufacturer may well conclude
that even if a subsidy can be proven, it may be difficult to show injury.
Moreover, requiring proof of injury can effectively neutralize timing
improvements incorporated into the new Act; the shortened period of
administrative processing must be balanced against the more extensive precomplaint investigation facing a petitioning party.
Whether a countervailing duty action will help a domestic manufacturer depends on the type and level of aid provided by the foreign government. In addition to the merits of the case, a manufacturer considering a
section 701 proceeding must balance the same factors involved in the decision to initiate an antidumping action. 10 7 In fact, the manufacturer may
want to consider a double-pronged attack if both foreign government assistance and dumping are occurring.
But see United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 437 U.S. 443 (1978) (nonexcessive rebate of
indirect commodity tax not a bounty); Bicycle Tires and Tubes from Korea, 43 Fed. Reg.
32,910 (1978) (wastage allowance for imported raw materials used in the production of
exported products not a bounty); Silicon Electrical Steel from Italy, 42 Fed. Reg. 54,899 (1977)
(purchase of stock in unprofitable manufacturer by state-controlled finance corporation not a
bounty).
104. Of course, in a § 303 proceeding for countries not "under the Agreement" that is the
only question.
105. Leather from Uruguay, U.S. ITC Pub. 883, 43 Fed. Reg. 18,343 (1978). Rapidly
increasing imports and market share together with decline in domestic profits, price, and
employment were key factors in the Commission's determination.
106. See, e.g., Yarns of Wool from Brazil, U.S. ITC Pub. 940 (1979).
107. See notes 48-89 supra and accompanying text.
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III
OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF
A.

SECTION

337

PROCEEDING

If neither a dumping nor a countervailing duty proceeding appears
promising to a domestic producer facing unfair foreign competition, there
are other alternatives to consider.' 0 8 Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930109 prohibits unfair acts or methods of competition in the importation
or sale of articles that have at least one of the following tendencies: to
destroy or substantially injure an efficient and economic U.S. industry; to
prevent the establishment of such an industry; or to restrain or monopolize
trade and commerce in the United States." 0 The remedies available under
section 337, subject to certain public interest qualifications, are a temporary
exclusion of the imported articles during the course of the investigation, I'
a permanent exclusion of the articles,"1 2 and a cease and desist order. 113
These remedies remain in effect only until the Commission finds that the
proscribed practices have ceased.
108. In addition to the remedies detailed in this Article, the domestic farmer has another
alternative in § 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. § 624 (1976). This section
provides that the Secretary of Agriculture must advise the President whenever there is reason
to believe that articles are being imported under such conditions and in such quantities as to
render ineffective, or materially interfere with, any program or operation undertaken by the
Agriculture Department with respect to any agricultural commodity, or to reduce substantially
the amount of any product processed in the United States from an agricultural product. The
President may cause an investigation to be initiated by the Commission. If the Commission
makes an affirmative finding, the President may impose either an import quota or an appropriate import fee (not in excess of 50% ad valorem).
One other alternative of interest mainly for information-gathering purposes is a Commission
investigation under § 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976). Under § 332, the
Commission, either upon its own motion or upon filing of a request, must investigate and
report on a number of aspects of international trade, including the duty "in general, to investigate the operation of customs laws, including their relation to the Federal revenues, land] their
effect upon the industries and labor of the country." Id. This function is purely investigative,
and the only result is a report to the President and Congress. However, an investigation may
cool any questionable import practices with the ice of publicity. It may also generate useful
data. In one case, a subsequent escape clause proceeding was brought with the help of data
developed during the course of the § 332 investigation. Shrimp, TA-201-12, U.S. ITC Pub.
773 (May 1976).
109. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976); 19 C.F.R. pt. 210 (1979).
110. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1976).
111. Id. § 1337(e).
112. 1I. §'1337(d).
113. Id. § 1337(f). The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 added a new § 1337(0(2) providing
for a civil penalty in the event of a violation of a cease and desist order. Pub. L. No. 96-39,
§ I 105(b), 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (adding new § 337(f)(2) to Tariff Act of 1930, to be codified at 19
U.S.C..§ 1337(f)(2)).
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The proceeding is initiated only by a properly filed complaint.1 1 4 It

is adjudicatory in nature rather than investigatory, as are antidumping
and countervailing duty proceedings. The Commission is responsible for
decision-making and enforcement in a section 337 proceeding. However,
the President maintains final veto power over actions taken by the

Commission.'

15

All but a few complaints brought under section 337 have involved patent infringement.' 16 If a domestic product facing unfair foreign competition has patented parts, the manufacturer should have the foreign product
technically evaluated. If there is an arguable infringement, it may be possible to have the imports excluded from the country even before the Commission makes a final decision.
Section 337 does not require a patent claim, however. The Commission has reaffirmed its jurisdiction in the antitrust area in several nonpatent
cases. 1 7 At the present time, however, it is difficult to predict future actions
by the Commission in nonpatent cases for several reasons. First, the current procedure is substantially different from pre-1974 practices. Second,
there is a dearth of nonpatent case law authority on which the Commission
can base its decision. Third, the Commission has been challenged in its
antitrust jurisdiction by the Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commission. 18 Finally, the Commission's composition has shifted since its earlier
114. The procedure is set out in 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976), with detailed regulations in 19
C.F.R. pt. 210 (1979). Note that this proceeding is the only statutory method of import relief
to which the Administative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-557 (1976), applies.
115. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(b), (g) (1976). For a general discussion of the effect of the Trade
Act of 1974 on § 337 proceedings, see Brown, UnfairMethodsof Compeltion in Importation,31
Bus. LAW. 1627 (1976).
116. As of September 1979, there had been a total of 71 complaints either filed since the
enactment of the 1974 Trade Act or decided under the provisions of that Act. All but ten of
these cases involved imports of articles allegedly infringing U.S. patents. Of the total 71 complaints, 21 were still in progress, 20 were terminated by reason of a license agreement or a
settlement agreement, 18 were determined by the Commission not to be a violation, and 12
were determined by the Commission to be a violation. Of these 12, an exclusion order was
issued in 11 cases, and a cease and desist order in one case. In that, the Stainless Steel case, 43
Fed. Reg. 8,304 (Mar. 1, 1978), the President disapproved the cease and desist order for policy
reasons. 43 Fed. Reg. 17,789 (Apr. 22, 1978).
Of the 10 nonpatent cases, three were settled, five were found not to be a violation, and two,
the Stainless Steel case and the Novelty Glasses case, 44 Fed. Reg. 41,971 (July 18, 1979), were
found to be violations. The Novelty Glasses case involved infringement of common law trademarks, unlawful copying of trade dress, and false designation of origin. For a general discussion of recent § 337 cases, see Kaye & Plaia, Developments in Unfair Trade Practices in
InternationalTrade, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 115 (Mar. 1979).
117. See, e.g., Certain Electronic Audio and Related Equipment, ITC Pub. No. 768, at 47
(Apr. 1976); Chicory Root, ITC Inv. 337-TA-27, Comm'n Memo Opinion at 1-2 (Oct. 1,
1976).
118. See Kaye & Plaia, supra note 116, at 161-63.
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The use of section 337 for nonpatent cases has been criticized because
it overlaps the antidumping and countervailing duties provisions to some
extent.' 20 For example, in the Stainless Steel case,' 2 ' President Carter
announced that he would disapprove an affirmative determination under
section 337 whenever the practice under attack could also be dealt with by
an antidumping petition. The Commission had found that Japanese steel
tubing producers were selling their products below the average variable cost
of production. It had further found that this practice tended to restrain

trade by reducing the domestic market share of otherforeign competitors.
No injury to the domestic industry was found. The Commission issued a
cease and desist order, but the President disapproved on policy gounds,
noting that there were ongoing antidumping cases dealing with the same
products.' 22 His disapproval was grounded primarily on a desire to avoid
duplication of remedies. He perceived the Commission's action to be an
unexpected departure from internationally agreed upon procedures for
dealing with below-cost sales.

As a result of these problems, section 337 has been amended by the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 to provide that the Commission must terminate any actions that are based solely on charges of dumping or subsidies.' 23 Actions that only partly overlap may continue, but a determination
119. Since the six-member Commission must not contain more than three commissioners of
the same political party and the term of each commissioner is five years, 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a)
(1976), the Commission's decisions are subject to frequent change in viewpoint. Only three of
the present commissioners were on the Commission in 1975, when the Trade Act of 1974 was
passed, and in 1976, when the decisions in note 117 supra were rendered.
120. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 6, at 65-67, 69.
121. 43 Fed. Reg. 8,304 (Mar. 1, 1978), order disapproved, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,789 (Apr. 22,
1978); see note 116 supra.
122. The Commission later found no injury in these dumping cases. 43 Fed. Reg. 32,568
(July 20, 1978).
123. The amendment provides that:
If the Commission has reason to believe the matter before it is based solely on alleged
acts and effects which are within the purview of section 303, 701, or 731 of this Act, it
shall terminate, or not institute, any investigation into the matter. If the Commission
has reason to believe the matter before it is based in part on alleged acts and effects
which are within the purview of section 303, 701, or 731 of this Act, and in part on
alleged acts and effects which may, independently from or in conjunction with those
within the purview of such section, establish a basis for relief under this section, then it
may institute or continue an investigation into the matter. If the Commission notifies
the Secretary or the administering authority (as defined in section 77 1(1) of this Act)
with respect to a matter under this paragraph, the Commission may suspend its investigation during the time the matter is before the Secretary or administering authority
for final decision. For purposes of computing the 1-year or 18-month periods prescribed by this subsection, there shall be excluded such period of suspension. Any
final decision of the Secretary under section 303 of this Act or by the administering
authority under section 701 or 731 of this Act with respect to the matter within such
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by the administering authority that sales have been made at LTFV, or that
124
subsidies exist, are binding on the Commission in a section 337 action.
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 also added a new section 337(f)(2),
25
providing for a civil penalty for violation of a cease and desist order.'
This change creates an alternative penalty to avoid the Draconian nature of
an exclusion order.' 2 6 But the future use of cease and desist orders is
uncertain, for in deciding on the appropriate remedy, the Commission has
generally favored an exclusion order.' 27 The Commission has reasoned
that a foreign company could avoid a cease and desist order, which is an in
personam remedy, by switching to importers other than those who are parties to the order. 28 It is, therefore, difficult to predict any effect of the new
law on the choice of remedies.
In summary, a section 337 proceeding is adversary in nature, and may
be expensive to pursue and uncertain in result, especially when a nonpatent
violation is alleged. Thus, for the present at any rate, a domestic manufacturer should probably pass up this alternative unless there is a strong case of
patent infringement.

B.

ESCAPE CLAUSE PROCEEDING

The impact of foreign imports may prove more severe than first suspected. If, for example, there have been layoffs in the industry, and a company or its hometown has been particularly hard hit, it may be appropriate
to look for more fundamental forms of relief. The escape clause sections of
30
or adjustment
the 1974 Trade Act 129 provide for a limit on imports'
section 303, 701, or 731 of which the Commission has notified the Secretary or
administering authority shall be conclusive upon the Commission with respect to the
issue of less-than-fair-value sales or subsidization and the matters necessary for such
decision.
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 1105(a)(2), 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (amending

19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(3) (1976)).
124. Id.

125. Id. § 1105(b) (adding new § 337(f(2) to TariffAct of 1930, to be codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(f)(2)).
126. S. REP. No. 96-249, supra note 47, at 262.
127. See, e.g., Reclosable Plastic Bags, U.S. ITC Pub. No. 801 (Jan. 1977).
128. See, e.g., Certain Exercising Devices, U.S. ITC Pub. No. 813 (Apr. 1977).
129. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 201-284, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2394 (1976).
130. Aside from financial or technical adjustment assistance, see note 131 infra and accompanying text, there are five forms of relief the President may provide, some of which have
restrictions. He may: (I) increase duties to a maximum of 50% ad valorem above any previous
rate; (2) impose a tariff-rate quota; (3) impose a quantitative restriction that is not less than the
most current quantity that was allowed to be imported in a period chosen by the President; (4)
negotiate orderly marketing agreements with foreign countries limiting the export of the articles to the United States; or (5) any combination of the above. Trade Act of 1974, § 203, 19
U.S.C. § 2253 (1976).
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assistance1 3 ' (technical or financial) to American workers, firms, and communities injured by increased imports. However, any import relief chosen
is limited to five-years duration, plus one three-year extension. No reinvestigation under this statute can32be initiated within two years after the lapse
of the previous import relief.'
The Act provides for submission of a petition to the Commission,
which will then investigate. For an affirmative finding, the Commission
must determine that (1) increased imports are (2) a substantial cause of (3)
serious injury (or threat thereof) to (4) a domestic industry producing (5)
articles similar to, or directly competitive with, the imported articles. 133 In
making these determinations, the Commission must consider several economic factors.' 34 First, substantiality can be shown by an increase in
imports, either actual or relative to domestic production, or a decline in the
proportion of the domestic market supplied by domestic producers. Second, "serious injury" may be shown by the significant idling of productive
facilities in the industry, the inability of a significant number of firms to
operate at a reasonable level of profit, or significant unemployment or
underemployment within the industry. Third, "threat of serious injury" is
shown by a decline in sales, a growing inventory, or a downward trend in
production, profits, wages, or employment. Fourth, "the domestic industry" may be considered as only those subdivisions of the various manufacturers that produce the article in question, or the major geographic area in
which the producers are located and in which the imports are concentrated.
The Commission may consider other factors at its discretion.
If the Commission finds substantial injury, its report is submitted to the
President with a recommendation as to the form of relief. The President
then determines whether relief will be granted and, if so, its form. 13 5 Congress may override the President's action to force him to implement the
131. Responsibility for administration of the adjustment assistance provisions is placed
with the Commerce and Labor Departments. Id. §§ 201, 223, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2273. No

change in this responsibility is envisioned by the Administration's reorganization plan. See
Reorg. Plan No. 3, supra note 39. However, adjustment assistance will be phased out by 1982.

Trade Act of 1974, § 255, 19 U.S.C. § 2345 (1976).
132. Id. § 203, 19 U.S.C. § 2253.
133. Id. § 201(b)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 2251.
134. Id.
135. In arriving at his decision, the President, who may consult with cabinet officers, must
consider the following: (1) the probable effectiveness of import relief; (2) the efforts being
made to adjust to import competition; (3) the effect of import relief on consumers; (4) the effect
of import relief on U.S. international economic interests; (5) the geographic concentration of
imported products; (6) the extent to which the United States is a focal point for exports of such
articles; and (7) any economic and social costs to taxpayers, communities, and workers. Id.
§ 202, 19 U.S.C. § 2252.
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Commission's recommendation; to date Congress has not done so. 1 36 An
important factor to consider when determining whether to institute an
escape clause proceeding is that the relief available is restricted both in time
and in quantity. 137 Moreover, the success rate for this type of import relief
is not great. 13 8 But this alternative is useful where imports have greatly
increased and are a substantial cause of serious injury to the industry or
community, for which financial adjustment assistance may be valuable.
Usually a greater degree of injury is required in an escape clause proceeding than in an antidumping action. This limitation is understandable, though, because a demonstration of unfair conduct is not required.
Thus an American manufacturer may wish to consider this alternative if
dumping or subsidies cannot be shown, but there has been a surge of imports, a significant decline in production in the industry, and widespread
unemployment.
C.

SECTION 301 PROCEEDING

A domestic manufacturer may not think the situation is bad enough
for an escape clause proceeding. In fact, the producer may prefer some
form of self-help remedy for unfair import competition. But there may be
little hope of competing with a foreign producer by dumping in its home
country if that government discourages imports through high tariffs and
arbitrary domestic standards. If this situation is the case, a section 301 proceeding may be appropriate.
Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act139 has been substantially changed
136. The procedure is spelled out in id. §§ 201-284, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2394. The Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 1106, 93 Stat. 144 (1979), made a number of

changes to the escape clause, chief among them being the authorization for the President to
conclude and carry out, as well as negotiate, orderly marketing agreements. For an in-depth
discussion of escape clause proceedings, see Note, Title II of the Trade Act of 1974: "hat
Changes Hath Congress Wrought to Relieffrom Injury Caused by Import Competition, 10 J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 197 (1976).

137. See notes 130-32 supra and accompanying text.
138. As of September 1979, 38 petitions had been received and completed by the Commission under § 201. Of these, the Commission made a negative determination in 15, an affirmative determination in 20, and was equally divided in three. In the case of an equal vote, the
President may accept or reject the findings of the Commission; in these last three cases, the
President took no action. Of the 20 affirmative determinations through August 1978, the President directed the negotiation of orderly marketing agreements in two, granted only adjustment
assistance in four, decided to provide no import relief or rejected the Commission's findings in
nine, and imposed tariff increases or quotas in five. Therefore, of the 38 completed investigations, import relief other than only adjustment assistance was provided in just seven cases. See
the Commission's annual reports for the years 1975 through 1978.
139. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 301-302, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2412 (1976); 15 C.F.R. pt. 2006
(1979).
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by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.140 Basically, the section provides for
presidential action to enforce U.S. rights under any trade agreement or to
combat restrictive tariff practices or discriminatory import procedures on
the part of foreign nations that unreasonably restrict U.S. commerce. It
allows the President to suspend, withdraw, or prevent U.S. trade concessions to offending foreign countries. The President may also impose duties
or other import restrictions on the products,' 4' and fees or restrictions on

the services, 142 of the foreign country. Such action may be applied to all
countries on a nondiscriminatory basis, or may be applied solely against the
43
products or services of the foreign country involved.'
This proceeding is nonadjudicatory and investigative in nature. The
Special Trade Representative (STR) is now responsible for gathering information and recommending action to the President. 44 The proceeding is
initiated by the filing of a formal complaint by any interested person
(including a trade association) with the Office of the Special Trade Representative. The STR must immediately request consultation with the foreign
country involved.14 5 If that country is a party to a trade agreement with the
United States and the issues raised are covered by that agreement, then

dispute settlement procedures must be invoked.' 4 6 For the first time, strict
time limits are imposed on all parties, so that a resolution is now theoreti147
cally possible within seven to twelve months.
140. Pub. L. No. 96-39, §§ 901-903, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (repealing §§ 301-302 of Trade Act
of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2412 (1976); id. adding new §§ 301-306 to Trade Act of 1974, to be
codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2194, 2411-2416).
141. Id. § 901 (adding new § 301(b) to Trade Act of 1974, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. 2411).
142. Section 301 is unique in that it can be used to combat discriminatory practices in
services as well as products. Id. (adding new § 301(d)(l) to Trade Act of 1974, to be codified at
19 U.S.C. § 2411). Congress has made clear that the term includes "international trade in
services, as, for example, the provision of broadcasting, banking, and insurance services across
national boundaries." S. REP. No. 96-249, supra note 47, at 237.
143. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 901, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (adding
new § 301(a) to Trade Act of 1974, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411).
144. Id. (adding new § 302 to Trade Act of 1974, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2412).
145. Id. (adding new § 303 to Trade Act of 1974, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2413).
146. Id.
147. The STR has 45 days from the date of filing to determine whether to initiate an investigation and to publish the petition or the reasons for a negative decision in the Federal Register. The STR then has seven months in the case of an alleged export subsidy covered by
GATT, eight months in a case involving other than export subsidies, 30 days after conclusion
of the dispute settlement procedure in the case of trade agreements described in § 2(c) of the
Act, and 12 months in all other cases to recommend what action the President should take. Id.
(adding new § 304(a) (I) to Trade Act of 1974, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2414). The President has 21 days to determine what action, if any, he will take. However, now there is no
provision for congressional override of the President's decision, since the old § 302 has been
repealed. Compare id. (adding new § 302 to Trade Act of 1974, to be codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2412) with Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 302, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (repealed 1980).
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Under the old law, the proceeding was surprisingly effective. 148 Types

of foreign trade restrictions that have been successfully attacked are import
restrictions, t 49 excessive or confiscatory

prices,'

5'

discriminatory incentives,

152

tariffs, t50

minimum import

and discriminatory restrictions.-

3

As a result of the revisions in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, and the

strengthened role of the Office of the Special Trade Representative, there
may be an increased number of petitions filed in the future.

Section 301 may also become more significant because it deals with the
subject of the "Code of Conduct for Preventing Technical Barriers to

Trade" (the "Standards Code"), 5 4 established in Geneva and implemented
by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.155 The Code allows U.S. exporters
to complain about, and secure reviews of, foreign standards practices that
reduce export opportunities. The converse, of course, is also true. Foreign
competitors now have a vehicle to attack both voluntary and compulsory

U.S. standards, whether promulgated by the Federal Government, state or
local governments, or private organizations.

Furthermore, the Code

obligates national and regional certification systems to grant access to
foreigners.'

56

The section 301 alternative is not useful to an American manufacturer
in dealing directly with increased imports into the United States. It may be
useful, however, in opening the market in the foreign country. At least it
would focus attention on the problem. Futhermore, there is no prohibition
148. As of September 1979, 18 petitions had been filed under § 301 challenging unfair trade
practices of foreign nations. Of these, two have been favorably settled; six are being resolved
through the GATT dispute settlement procedure; four have resulted in subsidy elimination,
tariff rollbacks, or import restriction adjustments; four are in process; and one resulted in an
affirmative finding leading to an agreement between the United States and the USSR for a
more equitable sharing of marine insurance. Only one petition, Japanese Steel Practices, 43
Fed. Reg. 3,962 (Jan. 30, 1978), resulted in a determination that no relief should be afforded.
That case involved alleged diversion of Japanese steel to the United States as a result of a
bilateral agreement between the European Economic Community and Japan. The STR and
the President determined that there was not sufficient evidence orjustification to claim that the
pact created any unfair burden on U.S. commerce.
149. See, e.g., Egg Exports to Canada, 40 Fed. Reg. 33,749 (Aug. 11, 1975).
150. See, e.g., Home Appliances to Taiwan, 41 Fed. Reg. 15,452 (Apr. 13, 1976).
151. See, e.g., Tomato Concentrate to EC, 40 Fed. Reg. 44,635 (Sept. 29, 1975).
152. See, e.g., Soybeans to EC, 41 Fed. Reg. 15,384 (Apr. 12, 1976).
153. See, e.g., U.S. Thrown Silk Exports to Japan, 43 Fed. Reg. 8,876 (Mar. 3, 1978).
154. For a text of this code, see H.R. Doc. No. 96-153, supra note 28, at 211-56.
155. Pub. L. No. 96-39, §§ 401-454, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 25312573).
156. Similarly, the Government Procurement Code will open government purchases of
goods (but not services) to foreign competition. For the text of this code, see H.R. Doc. No.
96-153, supra note 28, at 67-189. This code will be implemented by the Trade Agreements Act
of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, §§ 301-309, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 25112518).
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on seeking section 301 relief concurrently with other remedies.' 57 Thus a
domestic manufacturer may wish to use this alternative in conjunction with
others.
D.

MARKET DISRUPTION INVESTIGATIONS

Finally, if the foreign country involved has a Communist government,
an American manufacturer faced with unfair foreign competition can seek
relief under section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974.158 This import relief
alternative is specially designed to meet sudden flooding t59 of a U.S. market with imports from Communist countries that cause "market disruption."' 60 The procedure for initiating an investigation with the
6 1 If
Commission is essentially the same as an escape clause proceeding.'
the Commission finds that market disruption exists, it recommends to the
President relief similar to the escape clause remedies. However, presiden-

tial action62may be taken only with respect to the particular countries
involved. 1

The major difference between this and an escape clause proceeding is
that the standards are different. For market disruption to exist, the imports

must be: (1) the product of a Communist country; (2) competitive with a
domestic product; (3) increasing rapidly, either absolutely or relatively; and
63
(4) a significant cause of (5) material injury to the domestic industry.'
157. Section 301(c) of the Trade Act of 1974 contained a requirement that before the President could take action against foreign export subsidies he was required to find that the
Antidumping Act of 1921 and the countervailing duty statute were both inadequate to deter
such practices. In addition, Treasury had to have determined the existence of such subsidies,
and the Commission determined that the exports substantially reduced sales of competitive
U.S. products. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 302, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (repealed
1980). These requirements are not included in the section as amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 901, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (adding new § 302 to Trade
Act of 1974, to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2412).
158. Trade Act of 1974, § 406, 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1976). The Treasury Department has
recently given attention to the economics of state-controlled economies in connection with its
duties in investigating dumping and countervailing duty petitions. Treasury proposed regulations to deal with the issue in January 1978, and issued final regulations on August 9, 1978. 43
Fed. Reg. 35,262-63 (1978). Basically, these regulations allow Treasury to calculate the fair
value of the products of a state-controlled economy or state-owned enterprise on the basis of
normal costs and profits for such merchandise in a nonstate-controlled economy country at a
comparable stage of economic development. This alternative was used recently when Polish
steel was evaluated on the basis of Spanish costs. U.S. ITC Pub. 984 (June 1979). Ironically,
this issue was not discussed in Geneva because the major centrally planned economies are not
parties to the GATT. "
159. S.REP. No. 93-1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 210 (1974).
160. Trade Act of 1974, § 406(e)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2436(e)(2)(1976).
161. Id. § 406(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2436(a)(2).
162. Id. § 406(b), 19 U.S.C. 2436(b).
163. Id. § 406(e)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2436(e)(2).
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Congress intended the causal and injury standards to be less demanding
than in an escape clause proceeding.

64

The terms "significant cause" and

"material injury" are less 165
rigorous than the "serious injury" required in an

escape clause proceeding.

Unique to the section 406 proceeding, however, is the requirement that
imports be "rapidly increasing."'

66

This requirement prevented an affirma-

tive determination in two of the five investigations initiated under this section. 167 The Clothespins cases 168 are instructive. The petitioner alleged

that imports from China, Poland, and Rumania were causing injury to the
domestic industry. The Commission found that imports from Poland were
not increasing rapidly. 169 The imports from Rumania were fluctuating, and
thus were not "increasing rapidly" either. 170 The Chinese imports, however, were increasing rapidly.' 7 ' Ironically, the Commission later initiated
an escape clause proceeding on its own motion 172 which considered imports
from all sources (including non-Communist countries) that were increasing
in the aggregate, though not necessarily rapidly. The Commission made an
affirmative finding and recommended import quotas on clothespins which
were later imposed by the President. 173 Since the section 406 remedy could
be applied only against the country involved, the import quota would have
been restricted to China, but under the escape clause proceeding the remedy was applied to all such imports from any country.
It is clear, therefore, that the section 406 proceeding is useful whenever
there have been sudden surges of imports from a particular Communist
164. S. REP. No. 93-1298, supra note 159, at 212.
165. Id.
166. Escape clause proceedings require only "increased" imports. Trade Act of 1974,
§ 201(b)(2)(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(c) (1976).
167. The five investigations to date under § 406 have produced negative findings in three
cases: Gloves from China, TA-406-1, U.S. ITC Pub. 867 (Mar. 1978); Clothespins from
Poland and Rumania, TA-406-3 and TA-406-4, U.S. ITC Pub. 902 (Aug. 1978). An affirmative determination was made in Clothespins from China, TA-406-2, U.S. ITC Pub. 902 (Aug.
1978), but no relief was granted by the President, 43 Fed. Reg. 45,547 (1978). The latest investigation, Anhydrous Ammonia from the USSR, TA-406-5, U.S. ITC Pub. No. 1,006 (Oct.
1979), also resulted in an affirmative finding. On Decemer 11, 1979, however, the President
decided that implementation of recommended import quotas would not be in the national
interest. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,809 (1979).
168. U.S. ITC Pub. 902 (Aug. 1978).
169. Id. at 13.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 7.
172. Clothespins from China, Poland, and Rumania, TA-201-36, 43 Fed. Reg. 59,445 (Dec.
20, 1978). Commissioner Alberger noted that it was unfortunate that the § 406 petition was
filed, causing undue expense and delay. He concluded that "where rapidly increasing imports
are evenly split between non-market economy countries, it is clearly more appropriate to seek
relief under section 201 [escape clause]." Id. at 59,445 n.4.
173. 44 Fed. Reg. 10,973 (Feb. 26, 1979).
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country, and where the injury is perhaps less serious, the imports being only
one cause of problems in the domestic industry rather than a substantial
cause. Because of the "increasing rapidly" requirement, and the limited
relief provision, however, a domestic producer should initiate an escape
clause action, if at all sustainable, rather than a market disruption proceeding.
IV
ANTITRUST PROCEEDINGS
The alternatives considered thus far are essentially administrative and
prospective. None of these alternatives reimburse an injured U.S. competitor for damages resulting from unfair import competition. There are two
provisions, however, that do compensate an injured U.S. manufacturer.
The Antidumping Act of 1916174 was enacted specifically to provide
compensation to domestic companies and to penalize importers. Its provisions and remedies are similar to the antitrust laws. In addition to criminal
penalties, section 801 of the Antidumping Act 175 provides standing to an
injured private party to sue for treble damages plus costs and attorney fees.
Almost from the beginning this statute was ignored, although its dumping
prohibition parallels the administratively enforced antidumping law previously discussed.' 76 The apparent explanation for this neglect lies in the
1916 Act's requirement, which was eliminated in the 1921 Act, that the
complainant prove intent on the part of the alleged offender to injure a
domestic industry. Finally, in 1974, Zenith brought a dumping action
under the 1916 Act against several Japanese television manufacturers as
well as importers and selected sellers of the Japanese products.' 77 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied
a motion to dismiss the suit, recognizing it to be a case of first impression.' 7 8 The district court's decision may open the way to private relief if
administrative dumping procedures do not become less burdensome, more
174. 15 U.S.C. §§ 71-74 (1976). These provisions are actually the antidumping portions of
the Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 800-806, 39 Stat. 798 (1916).
175. 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1976).
176. See notes 40-88 supra and accompanying text.
177. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 402 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
The only prior reported case filed under the Act, H. Wagner & Adler Co. v. Mali, 74 F.2d 666
(2d Cir. 1935), produced no more enlightenment than an opinion on an issue of discovery
before it was settled.
178. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 402 F. Supp. 251, 254 (E.D. Pa.
1975). Significantly, the court also sustained personal jurisdiction over the foreign parties.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 402 F. Supp. 262, 328-29 (E.D. Pa. 1975); see
Victor & Hood, PersonalJurisdiction,Venue andService ofProcess in Antitrust Cases Involving
InternationalTrade.- Amenability of.Alien Corporationsto Suit, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 1063 (1978).
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expeditious, and more frequently favorable to the petitioning parties. The
burden of proving intent to injure a domestic industry or restrain trade,

79
however, remains an unknown factor.'

The Wilson Tariff Act of 1894180 is specifically defined as one of the
antitrust laws in section 1 of the Clayton Act,' 8' with all of the inherent
implications for private treble damage I8 2 and injunction actions, 183 plus
costs and attorney fees.' 84 Section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act prohibits
contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade where one of
the parties is engaged in importing.' 8 5 Like the Antidumping Act of 1916,
the Wilson Tariff Act provides for private treble damages in addition to
criminal penalties. A particularly harsh further penalty under the Wilson
86
Tariff Act subjects any property involved in the violation to forfeiture.'
Although most actions under this law have been brought by the Government,18 7 the statute's remedial provisions are also available to private
parties.
In addition to the 1916 Act and the Wilson Tariff Act, other general
provisions of the antitrust laws apply to the practices that are often the subject of administrative import procedures. Thus, for example, section 2 of
the Sherman Act forbids monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize "any part of the trade or commerce

. . .

with for-

eign nations." 18 8 That law covers both domestic and foreign
corporations.' 8 9 Similarly, section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act' 90
declares it unlawful to sell goods at "unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor." Both of these
statutes address the same elements as those that can be involved in an
antidumping or section 337 case. While proof of intent may be an additional hurdle, it has hardly hindered vigorous private antitrust enforcement
between domestic parties. Thus the antitrust laws may be more regularly
invoked if the administrative results are not more satisfactory in the future.
179. S. 938, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), introduced by Senator Mathias in April 1979,
would eliminate the intent requirement and add the 1916 Act to the definition of the antitrust
laws. See notes 181-84 infra and accompanying text.
180. 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1976).
181. Id. § 12.
182. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).

183. Id. § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26.
184. Id. §§ 4, 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26.
185. Wilson Tariff Act § 73, 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1976).
186. Id. § 76, 15 U.S.C. § 11.

187. See notes to 15 U.S.C.A. § 8 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
188.

15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).

189. Id. §7.
190. Id. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a.
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V
JOINT INDUSTRY ACTION
A small domestic manufacturer may be reluctant to begin an antitrust
case, fearing its disruptive effect, expense, and reputation of delay. 19' However, his alternatives are both expensive and somewhat susceptible to political manipulation. How, then, can a small company fight unfair foreign
competition?
Almost every law discussed thus far requires evidence of impact by
imports on an entire industry. Even an antitrust case requires extensive
market and economic evidence. To fight unfair competition effectively, a
manufacturer may need the cooperation of other companies in the industry
and of trade associations. Joint action eases not only the burden of gathering proof, but also costs. Collaboration by competitors to initiate an
antidumping proceeding, or to seek another form of governmental relief
from alleged unfair import competition, is lawful under the U.S. antitrust
laws.
The Supreme Court has recognized the right of business competitors to
act together to invoke enforcement of existing laws without incurring liability themselves for antitrust violations. This right to participate in the governmental process without antitrust liability is known as the NoerrPennington doctrine. In the leading case of Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference v. NoerrMotor Freight,Inc., 192 the Court held that the exercise
of political rights, even where anticompetitive effects mightfollow, is exempt
from the prohibitions of the Sherman Act. The Court declared that "[t]he
right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and
we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these
freedoms."' 193 The Court concluded: "We think it equally clear that the
Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more persons from associating
together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to take
particular action with respect to a law that would produce a restraint or
monopoly."' 194 In United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington,195 the
Supreme Court, relying on Noerr, held that "U]oint efforts to influence pub191. This common assumption often overlooks the opportunities for a preliminary injunction that can provide more flexibility and expeditious relief than anything available administratively.
192. 365 U.S. 127 (1960).
193. Id. at 138.
194. Id. at 136.
195. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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lic officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to elimi196
nate competition."'
In a more recent action, California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited,197 the Court held that use of administrative and judicial pro-

ceedings by a group of competitors is also exempt from antitrust prohibitions under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The Court stated that the

Noerr-Pennington "philosophy governs the approach of citizens or groups
of them to administrative agencies (which are both creatures of the legisla-

ture, and arms of the executive) and to courts, the third branch of Government. Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the
Government."1 98
In Noerr, the Supreme Court noted only one exception to the general

antitrust exemption for a petition to the Government. There is no protection from the operation of the antitrust laws if an attempt to influence the

Government is only a "sham" and not a bona fide effort to obtain governmental assistance or to protect legal rights. 199 Filing a good faith lawsuit or

administrative petition, which may have anticompetitive effects, does not
bring such conduct under the exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,

however. 2°° Thus a bona fide joint effort to enforce import regulations
sellers falls clearly within
against apparent unlawful practices by foreign
20 1
the Noerr-Penningtonantitrust exemption.
CONCLUSION

The last year culminated a decade of growing familiarity in the United
States with the dislocations that foreign trade deficits can inflict on the
national economy and domestic business. The discomfort is not only more
pronounced, but less tolerable, when difficult competitive adjustments are
196. Id. at 670.
197. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
198. Id. at 510.
199. 365 U.S. at 144.
200. Thus, in Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd.
of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), the "sham" exception did not apply when
a coalition of restaurant owners went before a building permit board to oppose the issuance of
building permits to McDonald's restaurants. The Ninth Circuit found that "[tihe activities
. . . consist entirely of attempts to lobby and petition a governmental body. Under Noerr and
Pennington. . . these activities are absblutely immune from antitrust liability." Id. at 1080;
see Rush-Hampton Indus., Inc. v. Home Ventilating Inst., 419 F. Supp. 19 (M.D. Fla. 1976).
201. Even the Antitrust Division, despite its expressed concern "with the possible anticompetitive effects of increased resort to the antidumping law," acknowledges the right of
either a single domestic monopolist or a group of several companies lawfully to seek import
relief, provided there are reasonable grounds to believe the facts alleged are true and that
administrative relief proceedings do not serve simply as a backdrop for private negotiations
with foreign competitors. Statement by D. Rosenthal, Chief, Foreign Commerce Section,
Antitrust Division, to P.L.I., in Washington, D.C, (Nov. 9, 1979).
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exacerbated by noticeable-and sometimes glaring-practices that have
traditionally been considered unfair. It is therefore not surprising to find
fresh efforts to employ U.S. laws to minimize the impact of import competition that cannot be effectively countered through normal business
responses.
But 1979 also marked the conclusion of prolonged multilateral negotiations to refine and codify the accepted definitions of unfairness in international trade and the legal procedures to resolve disputes on these issues. So
the United States faced, on the one hand, a challenge to satisfy increased
utilization of many domestic laws and regulations accumulated and often
ignored over generations and, on the other hand, an obligation to bring
these laws into conformity with internationally accepted norms. Although
it may be somewhat premature to reach a conclusion, an observation on the
ultimate juxtaposition of these forces is possible.
The net result seems to be that a great deal of effort went into very few
significant changes in U.S. law. The legal alternatives available for domestic industries to obtain redress from unfair import competition are substantially the same as they were before passage of the Trade Agreements Act of
1979. To be sure, some administrative procedures have been modified, a
few administrators have changed desks, some time periods may have been
shortened, more judicial review is available, and a few elusive conceptual
problems have received new or modified labels. Still, until experience with
the changes in the law has been sufficient to generate comparative statistics,
it is unlikely that the underlying legal advice that a knowledgeable practitioner will give to a domestic client will vary in any material respect from
that given over the last few years. And that advice must be to review carefully the available facts concerning a foreign seller's business practices, to
evaluate realistically the impact of these imports on the domestic competitor and industry, and then to proceed systematically through the array of
alternative legal proceedings to find the most suitable form of relief. While
a vast quantity of legal resource material was certainly generated during the
year 1979, it will be the rare case where the conclusions reached in 1980 will
not be the same as those that would have been reached in 1978.

